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INTRODUCTION 
In 1995 the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) was passed.  The 
FTDA defined dilution as “the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to 
identify and distinguish goods or services.”2  Before 1995, protection against 
dilution was a state matter that Congress felt was inadequate “because famous 
marks ordinarily are used on a nationwide basis . . . [and] some courts are 
reluctant to grant nationwide injunctions for violation[s] of state law.”3  Later 
in 2006, the Trademark Dilution Revision Act (TDRA) amended the FTDA and 
 
1. J.D. Candidate at Marquette University Law School (May 2019).  I would like to thank my 
family for their constant support during my time in law school. 
2. Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2005). 
3. H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3-4 (1995). 
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explicitly provided a fair use defense to dilution for parodies.4  Notably, parody 
is not available as a fair use defense when the allegedly invalid use serves as a 
designation of source.5   
Meaning that for the fair use parody defense to apply, the parody must not 
simultaneously operate as a designation of source while acting as a parody.  
However, courts have largely failed to adequately assess this.  Instead, the 
parody defense’s impact has been that once another’s use of the famous mark 
is deemed a parody, then the famous mark holder’s dilution claim fails without 
any meaningful discussion of whether the alleged diluting use is operating as a 
designation of source.  This is frustrating to famous mark holders because, 
commercially, when trademarks are subjected to mockery or become the butt 
of a joke, mark holders want to enjoin such harmful uses whenever possible.6  
Today, the TDRA parody exception is strong. Once a use is labeled “parody” 
there is little opportunity for the famous mark holder to stop the use.7  
Following the 2006 TDRA amendments, highly creative industries, such as 
fashion, have been fighting an uphill battle to protect their trademarks that fuel 
a billion-dollar industry.8  Application of the TDRA’s parody exception 
showcases the law’s failure to adequately protect trademarks in highly creative 
and competitive industries, such as fashion.  While the FTDA sought to protect 
investments in developing and sustaining famous marks that stretch across the 
country from devaluation by dilution, the TDRA parody exception carved a 
hole in the law for almost blanket protection of uses labeled a parody by courts 
who ignore whether the parody is also a designation of source.  Currently, 
parody is interpreted so broadly that the TDRA’s exception makes it difficult 
for trademark holders to protect their trademarks in all but extreme cases.  
This comment will address how the TDRA has left famous mark holders, 
particularly high-end fashion house Louis Vuitton, with little in its arsenal to 
prevent others from mocking and devaluing its marks despite its worthy efforts.  
Part II addresses the relationship between trademark infringement, dilution, and 
parody.  Part III takes a closer look at fashion giant Louis Vuitton’s strides to 
protect its famous marks and the courts’ differing approaches to assessing 
whether a parody exists.  Part III also addresses the relationship between parody 
 
4. Trademark Dilution Revision Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006). 
5. Id. at § 1125 (c)(3)(A)(ii). 
6. Justin J. Gunnell, Evaluation of the Dilution-Parody Paradox in the Wake of 
the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 441, 442 (2008). 
7. Id. 
8. Joint Economic Committee, Economic Impact of the Fashion Industry, (Feb. 6, 2015) 
https://maloney.house.gov/sites/maloney.house.gov/files/documents/The%20Economic%20Impact%
20of%20the%20Fashion%20Industry%20—%20JEC%20report%20FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P4RJ-ELG8].  
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when it does and does not operate as a designation of source.  Part IV offers a 
discussion of the future implications due to the court’s treatment of the parody 
exception.  
I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRADEMARK, DILUTION, AND PARODY 
A. Trademark 
To best understand dilution, it must first be differentiated from trademark 
infringement, which in turn should be viewed in contrast to patent and 
copyright infringement.  Trademark infringement claims require markedly 
different elements than copyright and patent infringement claims.9  In a 
trademark infringement action, the plaintiff must show that consumers are 
likely to be confused about a product’s source or falsely identify a product as 
another’s product.10  Copyright infringement claims require a plaintiff to 
establish ownership of a work and another’s unauthorized copying of that 
work.11  Patent infringement requires a showing that someone used, sold, or 
produced a patented work without permission.12   
Copyrights and patents protect whoever possesses ownership of the 
copyright or patent, whereas trademarks focus on consumer protection.13  
Copyright protection seeks to encourage future creative works and patent 
protection seeks to encourage future inventions.14  Copyright and patent holders 
own specific works that, if not protected, may stifle incentives for future 
creativity and innovation.15  In contrast, trademarks differentiate products in a 
market for the sake of consumers.16  Trademarks do not seek to overtly promote 
newness and creativity in the way copyright and patents operate.  The goal of 
trademark law is not to promote monopolistic trademarks, rather it is to sustain 
the freedom and fairness of the marketplace.17  This is why trademark law 
largely protects the consumer from confusion, rather than the interests of a 
producer.18  Trademark law allows producers to distinguish themselves from 
 
9. Gunnell, supra note 6, at 444. 
10. Sandra L. Rierson, The Myth And Reality Of Dilution, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 212, 213 
(2012). 
11. Gunnell, supra note 6, at 444. 
12. Gunnell, supra note 6, at 444.  
13. Gunnell, supra note 6, at 444.  
14. Gunnell, supra note 6, at 444. 
15. Gunnell, supra note 6, at 444. 
16. Rierson, supra note 10 at 234-235. 
17. Rierson, supra note 10, at 234-235. 
18. Id. 
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one another in the marketplace to prevent consumers from being tricked into 
purchasing a product posing as another.   
However, in passing the FTDA, Congress saw the need to protect famous 
marks from their own fame.19  As a policy matter, Congress concluded that 
famous marks that become so famous as to not cause customer confusion 
should not be left without remedy in the law when others take advantage of 
them.20  This is largely because a substantial amount of time and money are 
required to develop a mark into a famous mark and such expenditures should 
not be left without legal protection.  By passing the FTDA, trademark dilution 
became federally protected and, in contrast to trademark infringement, is 
similar to copyright and patent infringement because the right is more property-
like and protects marks regardless of customer confusion.21  While trademark 
infringement is inherently consumer orientated, trademark dilution law is more 
producer-focused and seeks to prevent the “diminution in the value of a famous 
mark.”22  
B. Dilution and Parody 
Dilution protects against the gradual reduction of a famous trademark’s 
ability to operate as a source identifier of a producer.23  Dilution under federal 
law is an “association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name 
and a famous mark,” which either “impairs the distinctiveness of the famous 
mark,” known as blurring, or “harms the reputation of the famous mark,” 
known as tarnishment.24  Further, dilution law stands in direct conflict with First 
Amendment speech.  Some scholars go as far as to completely reject dilution 
laws, arguing that they are unconstitutional.25  Dilution seeks to protect famous 
marks from speech that impairs the distinctiveness of a mark, while parody is 
protected First Amendment speech that legally subjects trademarks to 
ridicule.26  There is a fine line between ridicule that attacks the goodwill and 
reputation of a trademark that should be barred by anti-dilution statutes, and 
 
19. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3-4 (1995). 
20. Id. 
21. Gunnell, supra note 6, at 450. 
22. Clarisa Long, Dilution, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1033-34 (2006). 
23. Gunnell, supra note 6, at 442. 
24. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 4, 109 Stat. 985 (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000)) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006)). 
25. Rebecca Tushnet, Gone In Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law And Cognitive Science, 86 
TEX. L. REV. 507, 507 (2008). 
26. Gunnell, supra note 6, at 454. 
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ridicule that society deems worthy of First Amendment protection of 
expression as parody.27  
In considering whether dilution by blurring exists courts may consider “all 
relevant factors” and the FTDA provides six: (1) the degree of similarity 
between the challenged mark and the famous mark; (2) the degree of 
distinctiveness of the famous mark; (3) the extent to which the owner of the 
famous mark is engaging in exclusive use of the mark; (4) the degree of 
recognition of the famous mark; (5) whether the user of the mark or trade name 
intended to create an association with the famous mark; and (6) any actual 
association between the mark or trade name and the famous mark.28  The FTDA 
left many unanswered questions for the courts, but particularly: what 
constitutes a parody?  Before 2006, courts developed lengthy case law to 
establish when to grant an injunction against a parody in the absence of 
confusion.29  Courts weighed a multitude of factors including the interests of 
the public, interests of mark holders, and commercial implications in making 
their decisions.30  After 2006, with the passing of the TDRA, the inquiry 
became much more brief because the TDRA explicitly provided for a fair use 
exception including “parodying.”31   
After 2006, courts simply asked whether the dilutive activity constituted a 
parody.  If yes a parody is found, the court asks whether the parody is being 
used as a source identifier.32  If the parody does not operate as a source 
identifier, then the fair use defense triggers and a dilution action cannot be 
sustained.33  The TDRA does not define parody, and in practice parody has been 
interpreted broadly.  Overwhelmingly, courts hold that an attempt at humor 
alongside another’s trademark is parody.34  Some minority courts do not 
confine parody to humor, but rather to works that comment upon another by 
offering a critique, juxtaposing, or mimicking the work.35  Due to the language 
of the statute combined with court interpretations, the parody exception is 
powerful.  If a use is deemed a parody, while not operating as a source 
 
27. Gunnerll, supra note 6, at 454.  
28. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B).  
29. L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 28 (1st Cir. 1987); Mattel, Inc. v. 
Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003); Kraft Foods Holdings, Inc. v. Helm, 205 F. 
Supp. 2d 942 (N.D. Ill. 2002); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994); 
Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc. 41 F.3d 39, 40 (2d Cir. 1994); N.Y. Stock Exchange, Inc. v. N.Y., 
N.Y. Hotel, LLC, 293 F.3d 550 (2d Cir. 2002). 
30. Id. 
31. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3). 
32. Gunnell, supra note 6, at 463. 
33. Gunnell, supra note 6, at 463.  
34. Gunnell, supra note 6, at 466. 
35. Gunnell, supra note 6, at 465. 
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identifier, famous mark holders will have no remedy for lesser marks coat-
tailing off their fame.  This remains the principle issue: the courts’ superficial 
and subjective means of determining when parody exists and whether it 
operates as a designation of source.  
II. THE FASHION INDUSTRY 
The twentieth century generated most of the world’s famous fashion 
brands.  Throughout the last century fashion proved to be a booming and 
competitive industry.  In 2015, consumers spent roughly $380 billion on 
apparel and footwear in the United States alone.36  While many fashion trends 
come and go there are some brands that have withstood the test of time, such 
as: Chanel, Dior, Ralph Lauren, Louis Vuitton, and Burberry, to name a few.  
These fashion houses are mainstays; they hold a perpetual place in high-end 
fashion. 
A. Limited Legal Protections for Fashion 
Fashion presents an interesting challenge within intellectual property law 
about how to best protect the fluid, organic nature of the work.  Fashion trends 
build on each other, old becomes new again, and ideas are often recycled.  
“Sleeves, collars, skirt lengths, patterns, fabrics, buttons and hems all are 
elements with seemingly infinite permutations, but in reality there is a fairly 
limited aesthetic vocabulary.”37  The cyclical nature of the industry encourages 
designers to acknowledge sources and inspirations from the past or other 
designers.38  While some may argue that the lack of intellectual property rights 
in fashion drives the industry, most scholars and designers agree that without 
legal protections, designers and manufacturers are more reluctant to take 
chances, thus stifling the industry.39  Copyright and patent provide little 
protection for fashion.  Generally, copyrights are not granted to clothing, as 
they are “useful articles,” not works of art.40  Design patents require a showing 
 
36. Joint Economic Committee, The Economic Impact of the Fashion Industry, 
https://www.jec.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/66dba6df-e3bd-42b4-a795-436d194ef08a/fashion—-
september-2016-final-090716.pdf [https://perma.cc/8U2S-F895]. 
37. Aram Sinnreich & Marissa Gluck, Music & Fashion: The Balancing Act Between Creativity 
and Control, THE NORMAN LEAR CENTER, 6 (Jan. 29, 2005), 
http://learcenter.org/pdf/RTSSinnreichGluck.pdf [https://perma.cc/H82L-XPEC]. 
38. Id. 
39. Erica S. Schwartz, Red With Envy: Why the Fashion Industry Should Embrace ADR as a 
Viable Solution to Resolving Trademark Disputes, 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL., 279, 281 (2012). 
40. Christine Cox & Jennifer Jenkins, Between the Seams, A Fertile Commons: An Overview 
of the Relationship Between Fashion and Intellectual Property, THE NORMAN LEAR CENTER, 16 (Jan. 
29, 2005), http:// learcenter.org/pdf/RTSJenkinsCox.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SAW-FRKS]. See also 
Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S.Ct. 1002, 1004 (2017), which called into question 
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of novelty and nonobviousness that are difficult to achieve in clothing design.41  
The best source of protection for fashion houses is trademark law, which does 
not protect the overall design, but does protect brand names, logos, and other 
registered marks.42 
Trademark law protects “any word, name, symbol, or device” distinctive of 
a designer to identify the source and manufacturer of a given article of 
clothing.43  Trademark provides the essential service of protecting the highly 
valuable fashion brand name.  As the fashion industry expands and new 
designers enter the market, branding strength is essential to ensure a company’s 
success and survival in today’s economy.44  Many high-end fashion brands are 
particularly concerned with instantaneous copycats of its products made with 
lower quality materials that only seek to profit off the success of its famous 
mark.  High-end fashion houses with strong customer bases aggressively 
protect brand names and logos.  While trademark law does not protect the 
article of clothing itself, the tag or logo identifies to the consumer who produced 
the product.  Logos and other marks are principally the only means fashion 
brands have to assure customers that upon purchase they receive the quality and 
prestige they expect to coincide with the designer.45  
Protecting the marks of high-end fashion brands is precisely the type of 
protection contemplated in passing the Federal Trademark Dilution Act 
(FTDA), which sought to protect famous marks from slowly losing 
distinctiveness and becoming worthless.46  But, just as fashion brands are 
protected by the FTDA, they are also subject to the Trademark Dilution 
Revision Act’s (TDRA) post-2006 parody exception.  Thus, when non-mark 
holders employ famous marks to mimic and mock, there is little protection in 
the law if a court finds there is a parody.  This on its face is not a problem 
because after all parody has been codified in the law as an exception.  Tensions 
arise when courts insufficiently address whether the parody is operating as a 
designation of source.  Notably, Louis Vuitton is one fashion house that actively 
 
whether the well-established idea that clothing designs could never be copyrighted was true. Later the 
U.S. Copyright Office clarified that clothing was not copyrightable. COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT 
OFFICE PRACTICES, § 311.1 (3d ed. 2017) 
41. Cox, supra note 40 at 6. 
42. Schwartz, supra note 39, at 281-82. 
43. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). 
44. Schwartz, supra note 39, at 289-90. 
45. Schwartz, supra note 39, at 289-90. 
46. Patents: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Patents, 72d Cong., (1932) (statement of Frank 
Schechter). 
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seeks to protect its invaluable logo from attacks of parody, to little avail in 
court.47 
B. Louis Vuitton 
1. Parody Protects “Chewy Vuiton” Dog Toys  
In 2007, Louis Vuitton, known for producing luxury luggage, handbags, 
and accessories, brought suit for trademark dilution against Haute Diggity Dog 
for producing dog toys labeled “Chewy Vuiton,” imitating Louis Vuitton 
handbags.48  The court determined Louis Vuitton’s trademark was famous and 
distinct, even noting the brand was ranked the 17th “best brand” of all 
corporations in the world.49  Louis Vuitton holds many registered trademarks 
in connection with luggage and handbags including their original LV 
monogram since 1896.50  The dog chew toys were modeled after a medium 
sized handbag selling for $1,190 containing Louis Vuitton’s Multicolor 
trademark.51  Between 2003 and 2005, Louis Vuitton “spent more than $48 
million advertising products using its marks and designs, including more than 
$4 million for the Multicolor design.”52  The “Chewy Vuitton” toy possessed 
similar shape, design, and color as the real life handbags, but in lieu of the Louis 
Vuitton interlocking “LV” they used “CV.”53   
The lower court ultimately ruled in favor of Haute Diggity Dog finding a 
parody, and subsequently barred a dilution claim.54  The Fourth Circuit 
affirmed, but reached its conclusion through a different analysis.55  The Fourth 
Circuit began “by noting that parody is not automatically a complete defense to 
a claim of dilution by blurring where the defendant uses the parody as its own 
designation of source.”56  The Fourth Circuit noted that even though the 
Trademark Dilution Revisions Act (TDRA) allows fair use as a defense, parody 
only qualifies for that fair use defense when the trademark is not being used as 
 
47. Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 464 F.Supp.2d 495 (E.D. Va. 2006), 
aff’d on other grounds, 507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 2007); Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. My Other Bag, 
156 F.Supp.3d 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
48. Haute Diggity Dog, 507 F.3d 252 at 256.  
49. Id. at 257. 
50. Id. 
51. Id.  
52. Id.  
53. Id. at 258. 
54. Id. at 267. 
55. Id. at 257. 
56. Id. at 266. 
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a designation of source.57  Where a defendant parodies a famous mark and that 
parody operates as a designation of source, no fair use protection is available.58   
The Fourth Circuit’s decision makes clear that the existence of a parody 
does not instantly bar a court from considering whether dilution exists and 
allows a court to consider “all relevant factors” within the statute.59  For 
example, factor (v) “whether the defendant intended to create an association 
with the famous mark” and factor (vi) “whether there exists an actual 
association between the defendant’s mark and the famous mark” both question 
the parody’s purpose and whether it contributes to dilution.60  Furthermore, 
factors (i), (ii), and (iv) focus on the similarly between the mark and the 
parody.61  Ultimately, the court stated that, “a defendant’s use of a parody . . . 
may be considered in determining whether the plaintiff-owner of a famous 
mark has proved its claim that the defendant’s use of a parody mark is likely to 
impair the distinctiveness of the famous mark.”62  Louis Vuitton lost in Haute 
Diggity Dog, but the Fourth Circuit made clear that parodies between products 
more similar than a dog chew toy and luxury handbag may not qualify for the 
fair use parody defense provided in the TDRA.63  
2. My Other Bag Business Model Also Protected by Parody  
In early 2016, a New York district court granted summary judgment in 
favor of defendant My Other Bag (MOB) against Louis Vuitton for trademark 
dilution, which was affirmed on all counts by the Second Circuit.64  MOB sells 
canvas tote bags with the phrase “My Other Bag” on one side and iconic 
designer handbags depicted on the other, including a classic Louis Vuitton 
design.65  Louis Vuitton holds many trademarks including its classic repeating 
pattern design featuring the letters L and V interlocking with three stylized 
flowers.66  MOB sells totes mimicking Louis Vuitton’s iconic trademarked 
design, but replaces the interlocking “LV” with “MOB” for “My Other Bag.”67  
The Second Circuit held that MOB’s totes constituted a parody and was 
protected as fair use because MOB “is poking fun,” “invites an amusing 
 
57. Id.; 15 U.S.C. §1125(c)(3)(A)(ii). ((A) Any fair use . . . other than as a designation of source 
for the person’s own goods or services, including use in connection with . . . parodying).  
58. Id.  
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B); Haute Diggity Dog, 507 F.3d 252 at 266. 
60. Haute Diggity Dog, 507 F.3d 252 at 267. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. See id. 
64. Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. My Other Bag, 156 F.Supp.3d 425, 430 (2016). 
65. My Other Bag, 156 F.Supp.3d at 431. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
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comparison,” and the tote playfully suggests that while wealthy individuals take 
great care of their Louis Vuitton handbags MOB totes are for sweaty gym 
clothes.68  The court also concluded that MOB’s use of Louis Vuitton’s marks 
was not a designation of source because of the products’ dissimilarities.69  In 
contrast, Louis Vuitton argued that the association is too great, and the parody 
that MOB employs is not against Louis Vuitton, but the joke is a larger societal 
mockery between wealth and utility perpetuated at the expense of its highly 
valuable and aggressively protected trademarks.70   
Louis Vuitton relied on an unpublished opinion from the same district court, 
where Hyundai aired a commercial featuring a basketball with markings meant 
to invoke Louis Vuitton’s trademarks.71  The Hyundai court rejected Hyundai’s 
parody defense because Hyundai representatives testified clearly stating that 
Hyundai had no intention to compare or comment on Louis Vuitton, but rather 
intended to make a “broader social comment” about “what it means for a 
product to be luxurious.”72  Like Hyundai’s company representatives, MOB’s 
Chief Executive Officer stated that she never intended to disparage Louis 
Vuitton itself.73  MOB’s website explains that its totes are simply meant to be 
stylish.74  Therefore, Louis Vuitton argued that the totes did not parody Louis 
Vuitton itself because MOB had no intention to criticize or comment upon 
them, but only to make a larger societal point at Louis Vuitton’s own expense.75   
Furthermore, Louis Vuitton argued its marks were not necessary for MOB 
to get its point across; instead MOB’s use of Louis Vuitton’s mark simply 
dilutes the brand.76  MOB could easily make tote bags that are stylish and 
practical without utilizing famous marks to generate sales.  Nonetheless, the 
court declined to extend its reasoning in Hyundai, ruling that even though the 
totes convey a message greater than Louis Vuitton itself, MOB’s use of Louis 
Vuitton’s mark is an “integral part of the joke” even though the bags do not 
exclusively mock Louis Vuitton.77  Thus, Louis Vuitton failed again to find a 
legal remedy to protect its trademarks from being employed by lesser brands to 
generate association and sell product.  
 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 437-38. 
70. Id. at 435. 
71. Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. 10–CV–1611 (PKC), 2012 WL 
1022247 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012). 
72. My Other Bag, 156 F.Supp.3d at 436. 
73. Id. at 435. 
74. Behind the Bag. MY OTHER BAG (last visited Nov. 21, 2019) 
https://www.myotherbag.com/pages/about-us [https://perma.cc/4RN3-5VTZ].  
75. My Other Bag, 156 F.Supp.3d at 435. 
76. Id. at  437. 
77. Id. at  436. 
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3. Louis Vuitton’s Unsuccessful Writ of Certiorari to the United States 
Supreme Court 
Following My Other Bag, Louis Vuitton filed an unsuccessful petition for 
writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court to resolve the contrasting 
approaches between the Fourth Circuit’s Haute Diggity Dog and Second 
Circuit’s My Other Bag decisions.78  Louis Vuitton urged the Supreme Court 
“to establish a nationally uniform test for identifying parody in dilution cases, 
to restore the careful balance between trademark protections and First 
Amendment rights . . . [and] to prevent the widespread, irreversible devaluation 
of famous marks.”79  Additionally, Louis Vuitton argued that MOB would not 
have survived the standards set in the Fourth Circuit’s Haute Diggity Dog case 
if the Second Circuit applied it.80 
The Fourth Circuit concluded the chew toys constituted a parody because 
they were first obviously an imitation,81 second the differences between the 
products were plainly apparent,82 and third the joke was immediate.83  Holding 
that the two products were so different that the dog chew toy parody was clearly 
not operating as a designation of source.  Even though the Second Circuit 
sought to apply the same standard as the Fourth Circuit, Louis Vuitton argued 
that in fact, the Haute Diggity Dog standard is far more rigorous than that 
applied in My Other Bag.84  The Second Circuit’s analysis began similarly to 
the Fourth Circuit’s by determining that MOB imitates Louis Vuitton because 
the totes are shaped like a handbag and the repetitious monogram is clearly 
mimicking Louis Vuitton’s mark.85  Louis Vuitton asserted that the similarities 
in the two courts’ approaches conclude there, due to how the Second Circuit 
first analyzed the association between the products and second the existence of 
a joke.86   
The Fourth Circuit placed great weight on the fact that the chew toys were 
inherently different than a Louis Vuitton handbag.87  Whereas, the Second 
 
78. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v. My Other Bag Inc., No. 17-72, petition for cert. filed, 2017 
WL 3034216 (U.S. July 13, 2017); Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v. My Other Bag Inc., No. 17-72, 2017 
WL 3036727 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2017).138 S.Ct. 221 (Mem), 199 L.Ed.2d 120, 86 USLW 3147, 86 USLW 
3154 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2017). 
79. Id. at 18. 
80. Id. 
81. Haute Diggity Dog, 507 F.3d at 260. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 260-61. 
84. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v. My Other Bag Inc., No. 17-72, petition for cert. filed, 2017 
WL 3034216 (U.S. July 13, 2017). 
85. Id. at 21-22. 
86. Id. at 23. 
87. Id. 
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Circuit also concluded the products were markedly different, but placed no 
significance on the fact that the products were both handbags, with virtually 
identical designs, and marketed to similar women that seek stylish, 
sophisticated, and versatile bags.88  The Fourth Circuit emphasized the 
fundamental distinctions between a crude dog chew toy and a high-end 
handbag.89  The Second Circuit ignored the comparable characteristics of the 
two handbags and instead distinguished the more nuanced characteristics of 
each company’s bags.90  The Second Circuit appears to conclude MOB’s 
concept of luxury versus utility rendered its product plainly distinguishable 
from Louis Vuitton’s notoriously expensive product.91   
Louis Vuitton understandably disagreed.  MOB sought to sell fashionable 
tote bags by latching onto the prestige and quality that Louis Vuitton spent 
millions of dollars to generate and continues to spend millions to maintain.  By 
parodying Louis Vuitton’s marks, MOB purposely sought to create an 
association between the products to gain the attention of fashion savvy 
purchasers.  MOB simply sells tote bags; what makes MOB’s tote bags special 
is that they depict high-end trademarks on one side.92  Louis Vuitton’s 
trademarks convey to a purchaser that their purchase possess quality, makes a 
statement, and is fancier than other bags.  The Fourth Circuit’s discussion as to 
whether MOB’s products operate as a designation of source, which would 
nullify MOB’s ability to employ a fair use parody defense, is lacking.   
Furthermore, each circuit addressed whether a joke existed differently.  The 
Second Circuit focused on jokes being “immediately conveyed,” because a 
Louis Vuitton handbag as a chewable dog toy clearly established that the chew 
toy sought to be funny and concluded that a parody existed.93  The Second 
Circuit interpreted jokes as more subtle, a “juxtaposition of similar and 
dissimilar” without any requirement to immediately convey the joke.94  The 
Second Circuit acknowledged that some people might not even recognize that 
a joke was conveyed, and that was not an impediment of parody.95  “The fact 
 
88. Id. at 22. 
89. Id. 
90. See id. 
91. Id. at 23. 
92. My Other Bag, The Collection, (Jan., 30, 2019) 
https://www.myotherbag.com/collections/my-other-bag/products/zoey-tonal-browns 
[https://perma.cc/KVK6-QUKM]. Note that on MOB’s website when given the option to view the bag 
the side depicting the high-fashion brands is the primary focus. To view the other side of the bag the 
viewer must scroll down and select a separate photo. 
93. My Other Bag Inc., No. 17-72, petition for cert. filed, at 24. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
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that the joke on [Louis Vuitton’s] luxury image is gentle, and possibly even 
complimentary . . . does not preclude it from being a parody.”96  
Overall, Louis Vuitton’s position was that the Fourth Circuit’s test should 
have been applied and the Second Circuit’s approach was incorrect because the 
inherent similarities between the handbags were far too great and there was no 
immediately apparent joke.  Arguing that the Second Circuit was required to 
conclude no parody existed.97  The Second Circuit’s approach to parody was 
very expansive and conflicts with the test utilized by the Fourth Circuit.  
Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s rejection of Louis Vuitton’s writ showcases 
another instance of the fashion giant attempting and failing to protect its marks 
by preventing lesser brands from making a mockery of and utilizing its highly 
valuable trademarks to establish their own products. 
4. Parodies in the Past and Today 
My Other Bag exemplifies how expansive the current application of the 
Trademark Dilution Revision Act can be to protect would-be infringing uses 
when they are labeled a parody.98  Parody absolved MOB’s use of Louis 
Vuitton’s marks, even though the CEO affirmatively stated her products were 
not a critique, and how they instead essentially utilize famous designs to create 
association with the famous brands and develop its own brand.99   
Parody’s definition has evolved over time.  Parody is derived from the 
Greek word parōidia, meaning “a song sung alongside another.”100  The 
American Heritage Dictionary defines parody as a “literary or artistic work that 
imitates the characteristic style of an author or work for comic effect or 
ridicule.”101  In 1994, the Supreme Court discussed how non-critical 
commentary on another’s work, merely used to gain attention, diminishes the 
would-be infringer’s fair use claim. Further stating that “parody needs to 
mimic” their victim’s creation to make their point.102  Other courts defined 
parody as a, “humorous or satirical imitation of a work of art,”103 a work that 
seeks to comment upon or criticize another work by appropriating elements of 
 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 24-25. 
98. See Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. My Other Bag, 156 F.Supp.3d 425 (2016). 
99. See id. 
100. 7 Encyclopedia Britannica 768 (15th ed. 1975). 
101. American Heritage Dictionary 1317 (3d ed. 1992). 
102. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S.Ct 1164, 1172 (1994) (discussing parody in 
the context of copyright infringement, which is commonly equated to the same property interests in 
trademark dilution). 
103. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 463 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(quoting Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309-10 (2d Cir. 1992)). 
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the original104 or “a work in which the language or style of another work is 
closely imitated or mimicked for comic effect or ridicule.”105  Many definitions 
required an attempt at humor or critical commentary to presumptively 
constitute a parody.106  Even though past courts applied varying parody 
definitions, the Second Circuit’s conclusion in My Other Bag is notably 
expansive.107  The definition of parody in My Other Bag included “gentle” and 
even “complimentary” comparisons.108   
MOB seeks to sell women high-end canvas tote bags through acquiring a 
prideful feeling of refinement by utilizing famous trademarks of high-end 
fashion houses, such as Louis Vuitton.  As mentioned, MOB’s CEO herself 
stated that Louis Vuitton’s bags were iconic and she never intended to criticize 
Louis Vuitton.109  Additionally, MOB markets to stylish women.  MOB does 
not want its customers met with giggles when they walk down the street 
because they hold a humorous bag.  The company markets its product as a 
fashionable bag for everyday use.110  The bag depicting Louis Vuitton’s classic 
design, invokes general notions of Louis Vuitton’s stylishness and expensive 
products to appeal to women willing to pay roughly $40 to look sophisticated, 
even when walking around with a canvas tote bag.111  MOB blatantly utilizes 
Louis Vuitton’s highly valuable trademarks to perpetuate an association with a 
more expensive caliber of handbag.  Louis Vuitton has no legal remedy due to 
parody being expanded so greatly as to include “gentle” and even 
“complimentary” comparisons.112   
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
Historically, litigation in the fashion industry is risky.113  The fashion 
industry is fast paced because the seasons shift regularly and popular trends 
constantly fluctuate.114  Simultaneously, the court system is notoriously slow 
 
104. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1268-69 (11th Cir. 2001). 
105. New Line Cinema Corp. v. Bertlesman Music Group, Inc. 693 F. Supp. 1517, 1525 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (quoting Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods., Inc., 479 F. 
Supp. 351, 356 (N.D. Ga. 1979)). 
106. Gunnell, supra note 6, at 465. 
107. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v. My Other Bag Inc., No. 17-72, , petition for cert. filed, 2017 
WL 3034216 (U.S. July 13, 2017). 
108. Id. at 3. 
109. Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. My Other Bag, 156 F.Supp.3d 425, 435 (2016). 
110. https://www.myotherbag.com/pages/about-us [https://perma.cc/4RN3-5VTZ]. 
111. https://www.myotherbag.com/collections/my-other-bag [https://perma.cc/KVK6-
QUKM]. 
112. My Other Bag, 156 F.Supp.3d at 445. 
113. Schwartz, supra note 39 at 296-98. 
114. Id. at 297-98. 
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with litigation sometimes lasting years, which causes court decisions to have 
minimal effect.115  Trademark disputes are somewhat unique because protecting 
a trademark is often in the fashion houses’ long-term interest.116  However, 
trademark disputes still pose practical drawbacks in the form of costs as well as 
disrupting business relationships because the industry is so fluid with talented 
individuals, ideas, and designs constantly recirculating.117 
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is one option for fashion houses to 
avoid litigation because many innate characteristics of ADR appeal to the 
fashion industry.118  For example, parties are more likely to be able to design 
their own solutions and continue to work and grow together because ADR is 
generally less confrontational and more constructive.119  This is important 
because the fashion industry is so collaborative and companies that drag each 
other through litigation run the risk of damaging future business relationships.   
The public nature of litigation is also an added consideration for famous 
marks because by bringing suits against smaller producers they are bolstering 
the notoriety of the smaller entity.  For example, some consider My Other Bag 
a “victim” of Louis Vuitton’s imperialistic protection of its trademark.  Some 
commentators went as far as labeling Louis Vuitton a “trademark bully.”120  
Louis Vuitton’s My Other Bag lawsuit put My Other Bag’s name alongside the 
fashion giant in headlines at the risk of causing traffic to MOB’s website and 
possibly increasing MOB’s sales.  Even with knowledge of such risks, Louis 
Vuitton’s commitment to seeking protection for its marks through litigation 
likely is not over.  The fashion house’s passion to enforce its trademark rights 
in court is a testament to how valuable its trademarks are to the brand and the 
lengths it will go to protect the marks.  
CONCLUSION 
Louis Vuitton’s failure to prevent companies like Haute Diggity Dog and 
My Other Bag from utilizing its marks evidences a concerning trend towards 
courts’ willingness to expand parody to render dilution protection of famous 
marks generally ineffective.  The Fourth and Second Circuit’s holdings leave 
future lawyers with conflicting ideas of what constitutes a parody and 
legitimate concerns about whether to initiate dilution litigation if parody could 
be raised as a defense.  Moreover, the TDRA’s application impacts the fashion 
 
115. Id. 
116. See id. 
117. Id. 
118. Schwartz, supra note 39 at 299. 
119. Id. 
120. https://abovethelaw.com/2017/07/bagging-a-trademark-bully/ [https://perma.cc/86DV-
VC5J]. 
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industry more negatively than other industries because there are already so few 
legal options to protect their business interests.121  Lastly, recall that consumer 
confusion is not a concern in assessing whether dilution exists.  Again, “the 
purpose behind anti-dilution laws is not to avoid consumer confusion, but 
rather, to promote a property-like interest in the mark itself.”122  This property-
like interest is weak, and even when courts are willing to find that a parody 
exists they are unclear as to what constitutes source designation.  The broad 
application of what constitutes a parody and whether it operates as a designation 
of source leaves famous mark holders, particularly high-end fashion houses like 
Louis Vuitton, with few options to prevent others from mocking and devaluing 
its marks despite its worthy efforts.   
 
 
121. Schwartz, supra note 39, at 281-82. 
122. Jordan M. Blanke, Victor’s Little Secret: Supreme Court Decision Means More Protection 
for Trademark Parody, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1053, 1061 (citing Moseley 
v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1115, 1122 (2003)). 
